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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy highlights the central tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—even as this fits with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson echoed this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This shift is major, but observers caution it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Conditional Involvement

A similar standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

An Echo of Competitors

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.